f God knows the future with certainty, then the future is (by definition) already predetermined. If tomorrow is predetermined and you don't want to acknowledge that the plan was decreed by God, you have only two choices:
- Some being other than God determines the future and is therefore more sovereign than He. That is a kind of idolatry.
- Some impersonal force does the determining without reason or coherence. That is a kind of fatalism.
So anyone who denies that God preordained whatsoever comes to pass but wants to avoid both fatalism and idolatry is logically compelled to deny God's omnscience.
That of course, is precisely the rationale that has led so many to embrace Open Theism.
The more sensible option—and the biblical one—would be to abandon Arminian presuppositions and acknowledge that God declared the end from the beginning, and that He works all things according to the counsel of His own will.
244 comments:
«Oldest ‹Older 201 – 244 of 244It is the Calvinist who has taken the obvious, long accepted and clear meaning of "freedom" and turned it inside out
Well then, please tell us the meaning. When you've finished, apply it to Jesus, and then to God and let us see if the long accepted meaning of freedom is the real meaning of it.
power of choice please define this in the view of the image of God.
"The man being made into a vessel of honor is not without his input"
So we can take how much of the credit Beowulf?
BTW, I don't need to heed your teaching any more than you heed to John Calvin, who has proven himself to be a fine Christian, and theologian.
So you can say I'm unsaved because I don't listen your interpretation. That's more of what the self-righteous Pharisees were saying to others, and to the Lord Jesus as well.
The Scriptures rule, not your interpretation, nor mine.
Dear Paul,
First, Arminius grew out of the Reformed tradition and many scholars think he didn't quite remove all his Reformed categories and so was inconsistent.
Yes, he kept his “reformed categories”, because he was reformed. He could have joined the Catholics, Lutherans or Anabaptists, but he didn’t because he was reformed. Of course, his consistency or inconsistency is the point in question, and shouldn’t be assumed.
And, if he wasn't, that he said he affirmed some of the same things Reformed say they affirm is only to point out agreement at the level of words. But Arminianins should deny nominalism. They should distinguish between concepts and their referents. I saw no attempt to exegete Arminius above. Of course how internet teenagers exegete Arminius to try and escape the cogent criticism of Calvinists is entirely different than his own disciple, Conrad Vorstius, exegeted Arminius (and Olsen's exegesis on this point is problematic and unhelpful since it frequently equivocates between sovereignty and providence).
Vorstius is bad news, don’t listen to him. It’s true the Remonstrants fell into disrepair, but then again, so did Geneva. You make a good point about the difference between sovereignty and providence. There are offenders on this on both sides of the debate. Sovereignty is God’s right, not His action. One can’t sovereign something. Arminius’ favorite term was the Dominion of God and he did limit God’s sovereignty in the sense that God could not act unjustly. So acts like issuing a command for the impossible or punishing the innocent, fall outside the Dominion of God, because such acts would be unjust.
As far as Arminius’ views on providence (which are perhaps more relevant here), he held to God’s creating, sustaining and concurrence in similar terms to Molina/Suarez. So it was fairly robust, although it stops short of causal determinism.
Second, Arminianism grew and developed. To restrict Arminianism to *only* what Arminius said is problematic in many ways. It simply roots out hundreds of the most famous Arminians from being called Arminians. This is one of the criticisms of Olsen's book, from both sides. He simply ignores much 17th century development of Arminian theology.
Well, this is why people distinguish between Arminianism and Classic Arminianism (also sometimes called Reformation Arminianism). Not that there are no examples of Classic Arminianism in the 17th century (Goodwin and Womock come to mind). But Arminius’ brand of Arminianism was reinvigorated through Wesley and the Methodists (Watson, Whedon, Ralston, Pope…).
Third, many contemporary Reformed criticisms of Arminianism are couched in terms of logical implication. That is, we simply think traditional Arminianism cannot logically keep what is says it believes in. Surely they don't think that just because they say they believe in x, y, and z doctrine that that means they can do so with logical consistency.
I believe the charge was denial, not inconsistency.
So, many Reformed thinkers simply agree with (what we think are) what consistent Arminians are saying from the Open Theist camp.
Yes, Calvinists and Open Theists (and perhaps Dominicans) have some common ground, but it’s ground that pretty much the rest of Christians don’t share.
Fourth, once positions are analyzed, differences come out. As Olsen points out in his book, Arminians want to deny any causing or decreeing of God and evil - God simply “permits” it, but not willingly (which is another problem, in my view). And so Arminians think that the Calvinist conception of God’s sovereignty in salvation is evil (or, “unloving”). So, they deny this conception of Sovereignty. But, if we are correct, then the Arminian has, as I argued above, simply maintained his belief in God’s sovereignty by limiting what God can be sovereign over.
God is sovereign over our choices, but again sovereignty is a right, not an act. If by sovereign you really mean God predetermines our choices, well that’s illogical (imply we can and cannot choose something) and also an unjustified definition of sovereignty.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Strong Tower,
Well then, please tell us the meaning. When you've finished, apply it to Jesus, and then to God and let us see if the long accepted meaning of freedom is the real meaning of it.
Genesis 1:1 says in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Since it was in the beginning, nothing preceded it. If nothing preceded it, then nothing predetermined it. This is was we call agent causation. God Himself caused this act (i.e. something outside of God didn't predetermine the act).
In Mt 26:53 Christ states:
Or do you think that I cannot now pray to My Father, and He will provide Me with more than twelve legions of angels?
Even though Christ would go to the cross and die, He was still able to do otherwise. The ability to choose otherwise than we will choose is what we call freewill (or libertarian freewill).
God be with you,
Dan
"Even though Christ would go to the cross and die, He was still able to do otherwise."
So Isaiah 53 could have been not fulfilled?
If by sovereign you really mean God predetermines our choices, well that’s illogical
So, you determine your choices?
What great cosmic power to bring into existence choices that before you can choose you must determine they are for them to exist.
God Himself caused this act
That is not the question being asked, the question was freedom. Define it. Could God at the same time create and not create. Can he be simultaneously Creator and not Creator? Or, more suited to this conversation, could God do evil? Could Christ have done other than the will of God and thereby, done evil? Was man created in the image of God able to do both good and evil?
Define freedom, and then apply it to God and to Christ in the same way Arminians define freedom. Don't just give us facts about choice, but about the choices available and the preconditions necessary for choice to be made. Then tell us, if freedom of choice is libertarian. Does the choice mean there are no antecedents, such as the holiness of God, the harmony of Christ's will with the Father's, or the nature of man as created or fallen?
Or, is what you are presenting Pelagianism at its worse? That man was created neutral in the image of God and that holiness/virtue only inheres in the act and not in the actor?
The ability to choose otherwise than we will choose is what we call freewill (or libertarian freewill).
So what you're saying is that God doesn't have freewill? Or are you saying that God is both good and evil and just chooses not to do evil?
It is interesting, eh donsands, that to defend libertarian freedom, one has to destroy the true humanity of Christ and make him like a sinful creature able to thumb his nose at God?
My Calvinist brothers,
Man's biggest problem is sin. We all agree with that. But it's an even bigger problem for the Calvinist caste system because if God ordains all actions deterministically, then God has ordained sin, as opposed to simply allowing it. This makes God responsible for sin, and makes God a sinner. This is the logical conclusion. But God cannot sin!
Arminians rightly put the blame for sin on humanity. We are so dead in our sins that only the grace of God can awaken us to accept Jesus Christ. But we do have the responsibility to have faith. Before I get a hundred "that's semi-pelagian 99% God 1% you," faith is not a work of salvation. The work of salvation was done on the cross by Jesus Christ. Faith is the recognition and surrendering to that work, and it's described that way in Holy Scripture.
God bless!
Johnny,
"This is incorrect, and once again depends upon the "definitional fallacy" of your apologetic. Definitions inhere not only in terms, but also in imperatives: e.g., the command of God to choose necessarily includes the power of contrary choice."
Again, this edepends on your "cause-I-say-so" fallacy. And, definitions, as such, do not inhere in commands. certain implications inhere in commands, but definitions qua definitions, do not.
Anyway, I obvioudsly disagree that the "power of contrary choice" to x or y is entailed just in case God commands one to x or y. I mesan, you may think that it does, but you'll forgive us Calvinists for not bowing down to what some dude on the internet says. Some dude with a pseudonym to boot.
"IOW, you are not simply allowed to "pour" your own meaning into it."
Right, which was my point with Cottrell. You can assert all day long, until you're blue in the face, that "libertarian" freeedom "just is" what is meant by "freedom" or "moral responsibility," but to me that huffing and puffing not too worrisome from where I sit in my brick house.
"In fact, so clear is the imperative in Scripture that the burden of proof to downgrade this in any way is with the Calvinist."
Again, you evidence your naivitey. I think it is "so clear" that Scripture, and philosophical arguments, militate against "libertarianism" that the burden of proof is on the Arminian.
Sorry to explode your small little world. But, there's other beliefs out there than you're own. Indeed, some people think your beliefs are downright false. Hate to be the one to break it to you.
""Moral responsibility" is a good inference from genuine freedom, BTW. No argument there. But I disagree that "all sides should agree that "freedom" doesn't automatically smack one upside the head as meaning "genuine ability to instantiate alternative possibilities."
Again, just because you "disagree" doesn't do much to move me. As I read the top libertarian action theorists, theyt disagree with you and your pompous self-confidence. So, I trust the putative scholars in the field over "some dude on the internet." Sorry to burst your buble.
"Indeed it does. God intended it to smack you upside the head. He wasn't giving Adam definitional games to play. It is the Calvinist who has taken the obvious, long accepted and clear meaning of "freedom" and turned it inside out, or at least torn a hole in it so it will no longer hold any theological car keys."
Hmmm, I missed the terms "genuine ability to instantiate alternative possibilities" in the text of Genesis 3. I can see how you see it in the text because of the presuppositional baggage you attach to your reading of the text.
"Naïve and dishonest . . .those terms keep popping up in your discourse. It is of the "protest too much" variety."
Is that different than: "It is the Calvinist who has taken the obvious, long accepted and clear meaning of "freedom" and turned it inside out, or at least torn a hole in it so it will no longer hold any theological car keys."
It's good to know you don't have a problem refuting yourself and excepting yourself from criticism.
"Further, I deny your claim that for "the past few thousand years" there has been any substantial disagreement on "freedom" (except when handled by determinists)."
Right, so when all the indeterminsts agree, that counts as long-standing agreement on the matter. Along with self-refutations, I see you've boned up on the fine art of begging the question and stacking the deck!
I didn't mean to imply that inderterminists disagreed (though there's solid disagreement to be found there as well, for all who care to actually read their literature).
"Indeed, the unanimous view of the Ante-Nicene fathers would be what you have decided to call "libertarian free will." Representative of this is Irenaeus:
Snicker. First, even if many of the Fathers agreed here, that would be irrelevant. And it would do nothing to imply universal agreement. Second, the only way this quote has traction is because you've boned up on the fine art of anachronistically reading categories into 2nd century thought. It's not Irenaeus' purpose to weigh in on the metaphysics of free will in that quote. Moreover, there's nothing there that a semi-compatibilist like myself would disagree with (as pertains to the metaphysics of free will).
"And pardon ME if I do not find persuasive such PDV phrases as "As anyone with eyes can see . . ." and " blinded by the partisan light . . ." These, again, add nothing."
This is nothing but your own form of PDV.
"This makes God responsible for sin, and makes God a sinner."
So, when a drunk runs into you and criples you, and you bear the responsibility, because you're responsible, you are guilty?
Logical?
So, when a drunk runs into you and criples you, and you bear the responsibility, because you're responsible, you are guilty?
Logical?
Maybe you'd better explain this one better, because in it's current state it make little to no sense.
Dear Donsands,
So Isaiah 53 could have been not fulfilled?
No, if Christ hadn't permitted the arrest right then and there, it would have been fulfilled in some other way.
But that Christ had the ability to do otherwise (i.e. libertarian freewill) is the plain statement of the verse. Paul indicated that libertarian freewill is illogical, but it can't be, because it's biblical. On the other hand, his notion of freewill (that freewill and determinism are compatible) is a plain contradiction, because the will is not free from determinism.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Strong Tower,
Me: The ability to choose otherwise than we will choose is what we call freewill (or libertarian freewill).
Thee: So what you're saying is that God doesn't have freewill?
No, God has freewill. I am not sure why you are asking me this. I argued that God's choices are not predetermined and He has the ability to do otherwise. I already stated God has freewill and gave reasons why I think He does.
God be with you,
Dan
Dan,
I'm sure you'll agree that most of your post isn't something I need to respond to since the it does nothing to contradict the point of what I wrote.
But, I will comment on one thing for you.
To claim that it is incoherent to claim a something can be determined and one can make a "choice," is to say something R. Kane would not say. He allows for moral responsibility and choices even though determined; so long as the agent, at some time in her life, formed her own will by a genuinely indetermite choice.
So, when the top libertarian action theorist doesn't see a problem per se, then I don't see why I should.
But perhaps you knpow more than Kane.
At any rate, that a libertarian disagrees with you must mean your claim isn't obvious.
There was a conflation of definition, responsibility = culpability. The two are not necessarily connected.
Question: Is God a morally responsible being? How so, seeing that God cannot choose to sin?
Another: Are all sinners by nature? Why are they held responsibile for the act of another? Who determined that to be the case?
How on earth would I be responsible for the drunk guy crippling me?
He has the ability to do otherwise.
Otherwise than good?
"How on earth would I be responsible for the drunk guy crippling me?"
That's the problem. You do not understand the difference between responsibility and culpability.
Tell me, did Jesus take upon himself the responsibility for your sin without being culpable for that sin?
"How on earth would I be responsible for the drunk guy crippling me?"
This goes back to the previous question I asked: How are you held responsible for what Adam did?
This goes back to the previous question I asked: How are you held responsible for what Adam did?
We are responsible for our own sin. Adam's sin infected the human race, which goes into the doctrine of original sin.
Mike Riccardi,
Everyone who complains that: "If God is the first cause of everything, man cannot be culpable," does two things.
1. Disregard any distinction between ultimate and efficient causes. God can -- and does -- ordain that sin be without Himself being the author of sin.
That's an irrational statement. I think you know that yourself. What does "ordain" without being the "author" mean? It doesn't communicate much, does it? What does ultimate vs. efficient cause mean? Again, these concepts are but smoke and dust, and don't clear anything up.
And, so similarly it doesn't deserve its own point, in terms of the decrees you fail to make any distinction between the decretive will of God and the prescriptive will of God.
Again, a calvinistic invention of concepts that are neither biblical nor are they rational. There are no differing wills of God. There is no decretive vs. prescriptive will discrepancy in God. Rather "He made known to us the mystery of His will...summing up all things in Christ." (Eph 1,9-10)
The mystery of God's will has been made known, so it is no mystery any more. There is no mysterious element in God's will which is somehow differing from the revealed will. There is nothing like that mentioned. Instead we read "This is the eternal life that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent" (John 17,3). Note, eternal life presuppoeses the knowledge of God. The inscrutable God does not save anybody.
Texts. First on the ordination of sin/evil by God, without being the efficient cause of it.
The text you quote has God causing evil things but nowhere do we see God being the origin of sin. That is God, causes calamity, like earthquakes, diseases and the like. But all this happens within an already sinful world, where God acts in response to sinful men. However, does God ordain/cause/author sin ? By no means. Here is your first text:
For if He causes grief, Then He will have compassion According to His abundant lovingkindness. For He does not afflict willingly Or grieve the sons of men. ... Who is there who speaks and it comes to pass, Unless the Lord has commanded it? Is it not from the mouth of the Most High That both good and ill go forth? Why should any living mortal, or any man, Offer complaint in view of his sins? Lam 3:32-33, 37-39
So there, good and ill go forth from the mouth of God. He causes grief and affliction, even if not willingly. He does it.
Okay, so "ill" is something negative but nowhere does the text have God ordain/predestine/cause/author sin . All "illness" and calamity is God's response to human guilt. But that doesn't mean God caused sin to begin with, neither is man guilty simply by definition.
Next you quote a text that claims God does not delight in the destruction of the wicked. Then you quote Rom 9 which says God wills someone's everlasting perdition. As a matter of fact, the text you quote here, that is, Romans 9:22-23 does not say God wills any everlasting perdition but instead indicates that God endured evil in patience. While the text deals with God's wrath, the word "everlasting" is not there. Rather God withholds this perdition for a purpose to be revealed later on. (Something you don't quote any more)
Here's the text you quote:
What if God, although willing to demonstrate His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction? And He did so to make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He prepared beforehand for glory.
So the mystery Paul is dealing with here is God's avoidance to demonstrate His wrath. God obviously has no final pleasure in the perdition of the wicked, just like the Ezekiel text you quote. Moreover, the question of culpabiliy is not even touched thereby at all. And this brings us to your next point
2. The other thing you do when you complain that: "If God is the first cause of everything, man cannot be culpable," is that you make the exact same argument that Paul refutes earlier in Romans 9.
So then He has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires.
Now the text you quote is about God's hardening the Pharaoh and God's usage of mercy. The focus here is: "who gets mercy and who does not?" This doesn't have anything to do with the origin of culpabilty and why man is guilty in the first place This passage deals with election and mercy, but not with guilt and the origin of sin.
Consider the word "mercy". It means "grace". It presupposes guilt. Without guilt no one needs mercy, right? So this text doesn't deal with guilt at all, but with the consequences. Election to mercy is because of the presence of sin, even if done later in life. But why sin anyway and on what basis ? Calvinism doesn't tell us.
So that's it. Period. Paragraph.
And not even that. The question of election, mercy and hardening is even further elaborated on in the chapter.
Then, here is your argument. The very same argument you're making.
You will say to me then, "Why does He still find fault? For who resists His will?"
"But if God is the one who causes/decides these things, how is man culpable? How can man be responsible if God is as sovereign as you say He is?" That's the very same argument.
Well, what does God cause/decide? That any man sins? By no means! The text is remote from indicating that. Seriously, what does God decide here? The matter of mercy! No sinner has a right to claim mercy, that is quite correct. However, that is not the point at all.
Are you saying God in His sovereignty caused man to sin? Don't be kidding....really. Sin is never according to God's will, but -by definition- the very opposite thereof. And nowhere do we read that God ordains/predestines/ordains sin!
And I don't know about you, but I'd feel more than a little weird about repeatedly making the same argument that the Apostle Paul is explicitly refuting.
By the way, let me repeat that you do not consider the entire argument Paul is making in the letter. It goes ch. 9-11, not just a fragment of ch. 9.
I find it only weird how you explain (or rather refuse to do so) human culpability taking the calvinistic presuppositions.
Are you saying "According to Paul, man is guilty by definition" ? While this would be an oxymoron itself, Paul is surely not making such a declaration. The topic is not culpability in the first place, but the freedom and the order of God's dealing with different people in election
Why should any living mortal, or any man, Offer complaint in view of his sins?"
Again, the question is not about the consequences of sin but rather the origin thereof
The same problem as above. Calvinism doesn't explain the basis for man's guilt. Why culpabiltiy -- still an open question.
I think that's exactly what Paul's (not-so-) imaginary opponent is doing in Romans 9. He's offering complaint. He's saying, "I'm sinful. We all know that. But if God ultimately made me sinful, then I'm not responsible."
"God made me sinful"? Mike, the bible is clear God made everything "very good". Not sinful. God did not make anyone sinful. Calvinists explicitly or implicitly say so, but it isn't scriptural.
And He's rebuked, by calling to his attention his sinfulness. You know your sinfulness. You know the evilness of your desires. And you know how "yours" they are. So learning that God ultimately causes all things is not grounds to forget that intimacy that you have with your sin. And that brokenness that comes from owning your own sin should not disappear when asking these questions. They should cause you, O man, to fear and tremble.
Again, Paul in Rom. 9 is not dealing with "why am I sinful?". Though the gospel answers the question of the origin of sinfulness and guilt, Calvinism deliberately refuses to do so. And Paul is not dealing with the origin of sin here but he's dealing with "Why does he have mercy on some and not on others?" Do you see that these are altogether different concerns?
So is man guilty by definition? Or what is the basis of human guilt?
Don't you think that Cavinism is absolutely irrational in this regard? There is no rationality in the reformed system here. I guess the only conclusion one can reach there is "man is guilty by definition". That's rational? Not really. Note as well, all apologetics must be grounded on reason and common sense. Unless Calvinism offers meaningful answers, rational answers, it cannot claim to be taken seriously.
Mike Riccardi,
Everyone who complains that: "If God is the first cause of everything, man cannot be culpable," does two things.
1. Disregard any distinction between ultimate and efficient causes. God can -- and does -- ordain that sin be without Himself being the author of sin.
That's an irrational statement. I think you know that yourself. What does "ordain" without being the "author" mean? It doesn't communicate much, does it? What does ultimate vs. efficient cause mean? Again, these concepts are but smoke and dust, and don't clear anything up.
And, so similarly it doesn't deserve its own point, in terms of the decrees you fail to make any distinction between the decretive will of God and the prescriptive will of God.
Again, a calvinistic invention of concepts that are neither biblical nor are they rational. There are no differing wills of God. There is no decretive vs. prescriptive will discrepancy in God. Rather "He made known to us the mystery of His will...summing up all things in Christ." (Eph 1,9-10)
The mystery of God's will has been made known, so it is no mystery any more. There is no mysterious element in God's will which is somehow differing from the revealed will. There is nothing like that mentioned. Instead we read "This is the eternal life that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent" (John 17,3). Note, eternal life presuppoeses the knowledge of God. The inscrutable God does not save anybody.
Texts. First on the ordination of sin/evil by God, without being the efficient cause of it.
The text you quote has God causing evil things but nowhere do we see God being the origin of sin. That is God, causes calamity, like earthquakes, diseases and the like. But all this happens within an already sinful world, where God acts in response to sinful men. However, does God ordain/cause/author sin ? By no means. Here is your first text:
For if He causes grief, Then He will have compassion According to His abundant lovingkindness. For He does not afflict willingly Or grieve the sons of men. ... Who is there who speaks and it comes to pass, Unless the Lord has commanded it? Is it not from the mouth of the Most High That both good and ill go forth? Why should any living mortal, or any man, Offer complaint in view of his sins? Lam 3:32-33, 37-39
So there, good and ill go forth from the mouth of God. He causes grief and affliction, even if not willingly. He does it.
Okay, so "ill" is something negative but nowhere does the text have God ordain/predestine/cause/author sin . All "illness" and calamity is God's response to human guilt. But that doesn't mean God caused sin to begin with, neither is man guilty simply by definition.
Next you quote a text that claims God does not delight in the destruction of the wicked. Then you quote Rom 9 which says God wills someone's everlasting perdition. As a matter of fact, the text you quote here, that is, Romans 9:22-23 does not say God wills any everlasting perdition but instead indicates that God endured evil in patience. While the text deals with God's wrath, the word "everlasting" is not there. Rather God withholds this perdition for a purpose to be revealed later on. (Something you don't quote any more)
Here's the text you quote:
What if God, although willing to demonstrate His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction? And He did so to make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He prepared beforehand for glory.
So the mystery Paul is dealing with here is God's avoidance to demonstrate His wrath. God obviously has no final pleasure in the perdition of the wicked, just like the Ezekiel text you quote. Moreover, the question of culpabiliy is not even touched thereby at all. And this brings us to your next point
2. The other thing you do when you complain that: "If God is the first cause of everything, man cannot be culpable," is that you make the exact same argument that Paul refutes earlier in Romans 9.
So then He has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires.
Now the text you quote is about God's hardening the Pharaoh and God's usage of mercy. The focus here is: "who gets mercy and who does not?" This doesn't have anything to do with the origin of culpabilty and why man is guilty in the first place This passage deals with election and mercy, but not with guilt and the origin of sin.
Consider the word "mercy". It means "grace". It presupposes guilt. Without guilt no one needs mercy, right? So this text doesn't deal with guilt at all, but with the consequences. Election to mercy is because of the presence of sin, even if done later in life. But why sin anyway and on what basis ? Calvinism doesn't tell us.
So that's it. Period. Paragraph.
And not even that. The question of election, mercy and hardening is even further elaborated on in the chapter.
Then, here is your argument. The very same argument you're making.
You will say to me then, "Why does He still find fault? For who resists His will?"
"But if God is the one who causes/decides these things, how is man culpable? How can man be responsible if God is as sovereign as you say He is?" That's the very same argument.
Well, what does God cause/decide? That any man sins? By no means! The text is remote from indicating that. Seriously, what does God decide here? The matter of mercy! No sinner has a right to claim mercy, that is quite correct. However, that is not the point at all.
Are you saying God in His sovereignty caused man to sin? Don't be kidding....really. Sin is never according to God's will, but -by definition- the very opposite thereof. And nowhere do we read that God ordains/predestines/ordains sin!
And I don't know about you, but I'd feel more than a little weird about repeatedly making the same argument that the Apostle Paul is explicitly refuting.
By the way, let me repeat that you do not consider the entire argument Paul is making in the letter. It goes ch. 9-11, not just a fragment of ch. 9.
I find it only weird how you explain (or rather refuse to do so) human culpability taking the calvinistic presuppositions.
Are you saying "According to Paul, man is guilty by definition" ? While this would be an oxymoron itself, Paul is surely not making such a declaration. The topic is not culpability in the first place, but the freedom and the order of God's dealing with different people in election
Why should any living mortal, or any man, Offer complaint in view of his sins?"
Again, the question is not about the consequences of sin but rather the origin thereof
The same problem as above. Calvinism doesn't explain the basis for man's guilt. Why culpabiltiy -- still an open question.
I think that's exactly what Paul's (not-so-) imaginary opponent is doing in Romans 9. He's offering complaint. He's saying, "I'm sinful. We all know that. But if God ultimately made me sinful, then I'm not responsible."
"God made me sinful"? Mike, the bible is clear God made everything "very good". Not sinful. God did not make anyone sinful. Calvinists explicitly or implicitly say so, but it isn't scriptural.
And He's rebuked, by calling to his attention his sinfulness. You know your sinfulness. You know the evilness of your desires. And you know how "yours" they are. So learning that God ultimately causes all things is not grounds to forget that intimacy that you have with your sin. And that brokenness that comes from owning your own sin should not disappear when asking these questions. They should cause you, O man, to fear and tremble.
Again, Paul in Rom. 9 is not dealing with "why am I sinful?". Though the gospel answers the question of the origin of sinfulness and guilt, Calvinism deliberately refuses to do so. And Paul is not dealing with the origin of sin here but he's dealing with "Why does he have mercy on some and not on others?" Do you see that these are altogether different concerns?
So is man guilty by definition? Or what is the basis of human guilt?
Don't you think that Cavinism is absolutely irrational in this regard? There is no rationality in the reformed system here. I guess the only conclusion one can reach there is "man is guilty by definition". That's rational? Not really. Note as well, all apologetics must be grounded on reason and common sense. Unless Calvinism offers meaningful answers, rational answers, it cannot claim to be taken seriously.
"No, if Christ hadn't permitted the arrest right then and there, it would have been fulfilled in some other way." -judge
So the arrest has to happen? So Christ has no choice but to die? And since He has to die could He die in a different way?
Could He have died as a thirteen year old?
Hi Paul,
To claim that it is incoherent to claim a something can be determined and one can make a "choice," is to say something R. Kane would not say. He allows for moral responsibility and choices even though determined; so long as the agent, at some time in her life, formed her own will by a genuinely indetermite choice.
I am not an expert on Kane, but I did read one short essay he wrote, which was included in the book “Four Views on Free Will”. I agreed with him on lots of things, but I did disagree with him on some things. My primary disagreements with him flow from scripture. I think he constructed a rather odd view of freewill, due to his not acknowledging the distinction between the body and the immaterial soul. He struggles to form a “physical” explanation of freewill.
In any case, on the specific point in question, the difference between Kane and myself is probably semantic not substantive. He states that “free will (in contrast to free action) is about self-formation.” (p16) So even if he speaks of determined choices (even though they are determined by the agent, not something external), he still realizes they are “missing something”. I am simply noted that the “missing something” is essential to the definition of choice.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear ST,
Otherwise than good?
In God's case, perhaps all His options were good.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Paul,
For your consideration:
"to select from a number of possibilities; pick by preference: She chose Sunday for her departure."
Dictionary.com's definition of choose.
link
What do you think choice means?
God be with you,
Dan
"Adam's sin infected the human race, which goes into the doctrine of original sin."
So you are held responsible for Adam's sin, even though you did not commit it?
I take it you believe in original sin by your statement. Leaving the guilt as imputed question as made clear in Scripture behind, we are held liable at least in that we have been infected, right? And will in time procede to actually sin for which we will incur guilt, right? But the reason that is so was because of the infection caused by Adam. So who is responsible in the chain of cause and effect for your guilt, you or Adam? If it was indeed Adam's fault you are infected and the infection leads inexorably to sin for which you are condemned, how say you that you are guilty? Wouldn't that make Adam guilty and not you? And likewise, if your reasoning skills are not as poor as ahelmets, then since God could have prevented Adam's sin and did not, what is God's culpability? Didn't God have a moral responsibility to prevent the deception?
perhaps all His options were good -GIMJ
When has sin ever been an option? Or, from whence came sin? Did it arise before the option was available, or did it arise from choice? Did the creature from within his inate goodness bring it forth? And how does that work?
"In God's case, perhaps all His options were good."
But he potentially could have chosen evil if it were available. And now?
Dan,
"I am not an expert on Kane, but I did read one short essay he wrote, which was included in the book “Four Views on Free Will”. I agreed with him on lots of things, but I did disagree with him on some things. My primary disagreements with him flow from scripture. I think he constructed a rather odd view of freewill, due to his not acknowledging the distinction between the body and the immaterial soul. He struggles to form a “physical” explanation of freewill.
Kane is only trying to show that indeterminism is possible given physicalism or naturalism. Libertarians have needed to postulate an immaterial soul to pull off their argument, this turns many people (in the secular, academy) off. Kane is trying to argue show that they should have no objection to indeterminism granted even naturalism. He is a Christian, and so may have different private beliefs that he keeps quiet in discussions with unbelievers.
In any case, on the specific point in question, the difference between Kane and myself is probably semantic not substantive. He states that “free will (in contrast to free action) is about self-formation.” (p16) So even if he speaks of determined choices (even though they are determined by the agent, not something external), he still realizes they are “missing something”. I am simply noted that the “missing something” is essential to the definition of choice.
Right, this is what I said. So, Kane says that one can make choices and be morally responsible even if their choices are determined. But, the "something missing" is that determinism cannot "go all the way back." So, for example, he grants that one's character could determine his actions, yet the person is still morally responsible. Yet, he claims that "at some time in the agents past" the agent needed to have some kind of "crisis of will" and he indeterministically "formed" his will, say, at t1. Thus, he formed a specific character at t1. After t1, at t2, t3, t4, t...n, the agent may make all his choices based on, or determined by, his character. So, all that matters is that at one time a self-forming choice was made. After that, Kane grants all the rest of the choices could be made deterministically.
This is essentially how Paul Copan answers things too.
The problem for both views, is that infants who die in infancy never get a chance to "form" their own wills. Kane told me he hadn't thought of how his theory would work in those situations.
"Dear Paul,
For your consideration:
"to select from a number of possibilities; pick by preference: She chose Sunday for her departure."
Dictionary.com's definition of choose.
link
What do you think choice means?"
I can go with that. I draw a distinction between having and making choices. The above says "select" and so I assume it's speaking about "making" a choice.
When there's 20 objections in front of me, and I select one of them, I have made a choice. Since it was decreed from the foundation of the world, I didn't have multiple choices all of which were indeterminitely open for me to choose.
But, given that I did indeed make a choice, and I did so for reasons, and I was not forced to choose what I did, and I had guidance control (cf. Fischer), then that choice was mine, therefore blame or praise could be ascribed to me.
At this point we'll devolve into the familiar territory of Frankfurt counter-examples, or luck objections demonstrating indeterminism doesn't provide the control needed for responsibility, yadda, yadda, yadda.
We want to see if moral responsibility can be ascribed to the choices we make. Just the mere fact that some agent "has" numerous possible choices, has the ability to instantiate any, and then makes one, does not entail responsibility - for our agent could be crazy. He doesn't have the requisite control needed to ascribe responsibility to our choices.
So, I think that we always need to go a bit further and make sure that whatever theory of choice we have, we can ground the responsibility of those choices.
I think, and this is something to be debated (and I'm not sure I have time for it, I mainly stopped by to show that Calvinists aren't necessarily misrepresenting Arminians when they claim that they deny a robust account of God's sovereignty), the libertarian theory of freedom doesn't provide the necessary control required to ground responsible choice making while the semi-compatibilist position does.
So, based on that, it doesn't mater so much of you like my understanding of choice since the competing option has bigger problems. Thus, I'm not so much concerned that I don't have the ability (though classical compatibilists would say that I do since they read ability hypothetically. I disagree with them, but that's another debate) to actually make many any alternative choice that I so please, all that matters for me is that I did make _a_ choice, and I have the metaphysical resources to ground ascriptions of responsibility for making that choice.
Hope that helped explain my position, though I know you won’t agree with it.
Dear Paul,
The aspect of the definition I wished to draw your attention to was from a number of possibilities. If determinism is true, the counterfactuals are not possible.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear ST,
But he potentially could have chosen evil if it were available. And now?
I don't think it could have been available.
God be with you,
Dan
Hi Paul and ST,
I am going to be off line for a bit, so I will leave it at that.
God be with you,
Dan
Dan,
I've tried to do this 5 times and my computer overheated and shut down. I am going to type as fast I can and not run it through a spell checker. Forgive the errors.
That's why I made the distinction between having and choosing.
On this analysis, your view allows one to have multiple choices in the sense that he can genuinely instantiate any one of them. Like having $5. If you wanted to spend $1, you could spend any of the five.
Conversly, I could make a choice to pick one apple out of a bunch. It is that "bunch" that I meant to imply "possibilities." They're not alternative. They're "the pile." On this analysis, that I made a choice to pick one apple doesn't entail that I could have picked any other one.
The other "possibilitites" or "options" or "stuff in the pile" are part of the sequence of my deciding or choosing what to do. They play a role. My choice is mine. It is not forced. And I did so for reasons.
Anyway, we only choose one thing. No matter if you could have actually instantiated another choice, we both end up making one choice. It is that choice we are responsible for.
Since the pheneomena is the same for both of us - I don't know God's decree and my pondering the secret things is not something that enters my deliberative process - and we both make one choice, there seems to be nothing lost on my end. The real question is can both of us be held responsible for the choice we make?
At this point in the argument, I would point out, as I did above, that semi-compatibilism has the resources to make intelligible ascriptions of responsibility. So, we both make a choice. It is superfluous to me whether I was able to have actuated an alternative possibility, option, "stuff in the pile," contrary to what was decreed. I actually think indeterminism does not. The control needed to be responsible isn't t be had (cf. VanInwagen's arguments, or Mele's "luck" objection, as for agent causation, see Choi's book, The Libertarian Dilemma).
See, that's the real issue involved here. Everyone makes a choice. Again, that does not logically imply that one could have made another choice. We stand before God or courts or friends and give an account for the choices we've made.
It seems to me the big worry here, then, is whether determinism can ground ascriptions of responsibility. That's where the debate is at, IMO.
At any rate, that's how I view "choices." You may as well call them "decisions" if you like.
Strong Tower,
You suggested the following:
Classical Arminiusism, does appear to be different from the Arminianism that is held by most Malletians. Quite different. Arminius' almost sounds Calvinistic. No wonder he praised Calvin so highly.
You are speaking from a lack of knowledge. My theological sentiments are quite similar to those of Aminius, in particular as addressed in his Nine Theological Questions. Arminius as a Reformed theologian was held in high regard throughout his life by those who knew his doctrines. He admired both Calvin and Augustine as do I to an extent. If you wish to grasp what "Mallettians" and Reformation Arminians hold to, perhaps you might explore the writings and teachings of those you seem quick to disparage. I recommend a starting point with Arminius' Nine Theological Questions as each goes to the heart of the false aspersions cast our way
Strong Tower,
I will lay it out as best I can. We are responsible as individuals for our own sins. A drunk diver hitting and crippling someone is responsible for that sin. The crippled person bears no responsibility for it.
On original sin: what happened in the garden with Adam was Adam's individual sin. We aren't responsible for it, but it brought a curse upon the earth and upon all humanity and all around screwed things up. But it wasn't God that caused the sin. He knew it would happen. He allowed it to happen. He did not cause it to happen.
To summarize, we are all responsible individually for our sins. God makes no one sin, but all sin. God provided salvation from sin.
On original sin: what happened in the garden with Adam was Adam's individual sin. We aren't responsible for it.
That's not at all what Scripture teaches.
"Therefore, just as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin, and so death spread to all men, because all sinned--"
Why did death spread to all men? Because all sinned. Past tense, completed action. When did all men sin? In Adam. Adam's sin was not Adam's sin alone. We all sinned in Adam. So we're not responsible for Adam's sin, but we're responsible for our own sin in Adam. That's why it says, "In Adam all die." Not simply because His sin cursed us, but because we sinned in him, and death spread to us through our own sin in him.
This notion of federal headship (one doing something in one's ancestor doing it) can also be seen about the Levites paying tithes to Melchizidek.
"And, so to speak, through Abraham even Levi, who received tithes, paid tithes, for he was still in the loins of his father when Melchizedek met him." -- Heb 7:9-10
Levi paid tithes to Melchizedek. How? He wasn't born yet. He paid tithes in Abraham.
But it wasn't God that caused the sin. He knew it would happen. He allowed it to happen. He did not cause it to happen.
First, this goes back to the heart of the post. Believing this statement that you just wrote makes you an idolater or a fatalist.
But even if we act like the original post wasn't written or ignored, I ask you: So how does that make God less culpable in your view? He knew something terrible was going to happen. He allowed it to happen. That doesn't solve the problem. God, fully capable of stopping something that He hates and has terrible, un-glorifying consequences, still allows it. I honestly don't see what ground you gain.
And also, to be honest, this discussion has almost surely turned fruitless. All we're going to keep doing is continue to show each other how our conceptions of the other positions are wrong. Nobody seems open to being taught. It's just an airing of one's own mind -- at least on one side of the argument.
Johnny D,
Excellent post.
God Bless,
Ben
we are all responsible individually for our sins.
And no one argues that we are not. The point made is how we became responsible. You've agreed that it was Adam, and not we who brought the corruption in, but we are responsible for that corruption, true? And if it leads inexorably to actual sin, one of the causal agents is without us, not within. Our sin didn't arise in a vacuum without some precursor, either within or without. Since we are born with corruption we cannot escape the fact that we will express it. And we cannot escape the fact that it was not we who brought it in. There is no possibility that we will not express it in time, is there? If there is no possibility that we will not, then how is it that we are held responsible seeing that we neither bring it in, nor have arranged those things without? How are we responsible for that which we could not have possibly caused?
Responsibility then, does not inhere in the act within or without, but in the nature of the actor. Question is, where did that nature come from? Adam is long dead, and unless you believe in a gnostic material transmittal of evil, the coruption or lack of holiness is God's doing. Indeed, though He is not culpable for the act of sin, Adam was, as a responsible agent He passed judgement and condemned all the works of Adam, all Adam produced, that being his offspring. The curse was from God, just as the creation is, and man is born in ruin, not due to Adam's ability to create man, but God's.
So one question for you is: What or who is the origin of original sin?
You do understand the meaning of original sin? It is a term that does not refer to Adam's sin as in the first, for Scripture relates that we die even though we do not sin in the same likeness as he. Instead it refers to the nature of man. The term is like aboriginal, meaning native. Original, means what mankind is. He is born in sin, not Adam's sin, but in native sin. And that by the fiat of God.
Now if it is the case that one who begins the process is held culpable as being responsible as the cause of the existence of a certain condition, then indeed God is the doer of sin. However, if the guilt of the action inheres in nature and not in the action, then God who is holy by nature cannot be the efficent cause of evil, the direct doer of it. That he can create man without holiness, does not make him the author of evil. It is the man, who is without holiness who will do according to his nature what he is. Scripture declares man is continuously sinning from conception forward.
The possession of that which is forbidden makes the person culpable. In Adam's transgression, he became the possessor of the forbidden thing. But, because he did, we bear the responsibility, and God, not only makes us to do so, but before Adam partook, he was made a responsible agent.
Responsibility inheres in the nature of man, not as the result of action, but as essential to man. That God has declared all men in sin, makes man responsible for it, not because he will eventually become culpable of the actions it begets, but because he is created responsible for the creation. That creation is sinful. Possession does not have to be a conscious act. Indeed, Adam was in possession of righteousness before he was ever conscious of it. Possession is by definition an action, whether intended by the actor or not, and Adam was blessed not because he had first acted upon choice, rather he was blessed in his choices because he was made the possessor of righteousness.
The question that must be asked is: If Adam, being made in the image of God, righteousness which does not choose sin (sin was not in him, nor was it set before him by God as a choice, for God does not tempt, nor is tempted) then how was it that he became the possessor of sin? Scripture tells us that the Satan decieved Eve and that she in turn decieved Adam. How is it that deception is considered choice?
Deception by definition denies that any true choice is presented. And, if both Eve and Adam believed that what they were doing was good and not evil, why were they held responsible for the actions of the Satan? And beyond that, why were they made culpable? The second is easier to answer. It is because they were the actors. The first is more difficult if it is the fact that since the action of the Satan was done to them they should not be held responsible for it. Unless responsibility inheres not in the act but the actor. And, that is what we find. When the curse is announced, responsibilily is not relieved because one has done something to another, but each is held responsible, even though. And, beyond, each is held culpable for their own actions.
The problem with Arminianism is that when it comes to assigning meaning to original sin, it cannot. For it cannot make the person responsible prior to choice; guilt inheres in actions, and not in the actor, and responsibility flows from the results of actions, and not prior to them. However, Genesis places the threat of the curse prior to anything Adam is either capable of doing by nature, or by circumstances presented to him by God. Now the Arminian says that God has given man free will in reference to external choices and that there is nothing within that necessitates what the choice made will be, either. But, Scripture does not make God the tempter, placing contrary alternatives before man, does it? It also declares that man in the creation was upright and good and created in the image of God, who does no evil.
GIMJ refused to answer if it is potential in God to choose evil. He danced around it. Scripture declares that it is impossibile that God should do evil; no such potential in the image of God. He was asked, if not before the advent of evil, how about now? Now that evil does exist, is God able to choose from the available choices, either good or evil?
The very definition of free will for the Arminian must included the potentials. There must be for the free will agent, the inherent abililty and the external option. But that definition cannot define God into whose image man was created. Now, what did God create, man who was not in his image, both good and evil in potential inhering in his nature? What did he put in the Garden for man to choose? Both good and evil? The Scripture flatly declares that is not true. God saw that it was good. And the tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil, is not in and of itself evil, for this is the very knowledge of God, pure and righteous. And God further told man what was good for him and that it was good to not eat of that tree. Contrary to the Arminian, God did not tempt man by placing before him good and evil, which is necessary in their view. No good father temps his children to sin! Does he?
So we have this: Man is now fallen and all his thoughts are continuously evil, all the works of his hands cursed, every choice he makes falls under that curse. How is that? If there are good things external as well as evil, how is it that all that man does whether good or evil, is considered sin and produces death?
The Arminian must propose one of two alternatives. Man is corrupted but not entirely nor does he by possession of what is forbidden (corruption) incur guilt (condemnation) but only by choice becomes guilty. Or, man does not inherit the corruption and thereby is not guilty and becomes so only by the influence of the creation around him; and righteousness is a matter of choice from alternatives presented to him (by whom we have already asked). The first is semi-Pelagian, the second Pelagian. In either case, whether from that residual goodness, or from the position of original pureness, man acts in such a way as to either gain virtue or vice, and for all intents and purposes is Pelagian. Not even prevenient grace can grant escape from the pervasive corruption in man. When the Arminian presents it, it in reality only results in man's choice being the cause of his righteousness from a corrupt nature, and not the nature of man made righteous by God that makes the choice righteous. Prevenient grace simply resets the man to the postition of the Pelagian while granting a kind of dualist form of total depravity where corruption sits beside goodness, rather than goodness having been removed so that the entire man is corrupted in all faculties.
Now my question for you is this: If man is only responsible for his own actions, how so, seeing that he is corrupted (even it not entirely in the Arminian schema). If the corruption was due to the actions of another, then why is a person held responsible for any choice made from that corruption? Shouldn't the blame be put upon the one causing the corruption? Now you will either have to accuse God of evil for making all men to be born in sin, or you can make Adam only, guilty, and that he by some supernatural ability able to transfer the corruption to man. Still, how is man held responsibile for the the actions of another, or those actions that result from the action taken by another. Or, there is another definition of responsibility you have not comprehended. And, you will have to come to grips with what makes one culpable? For if the nature into which man is born is not the supernatural act of Adam, but the imputed corruption of a fallen nature by the supernatural act of God, why is he not culpable? Is he by nature responsible for his creation?
Mike R-
In the above it might appear that I have confused imputed sin and original sin. That was not the intent and I agree completely with what you have written.
Strong Tower,
You have a lot of philosophical speculation with little to no Biblical support. It's clear that all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God. And yes sin entered the world through Adam. How would this mean it makes God the cause of sin? He created the potential for sin when he gave as an ability to choose or choose otherwise, but He did NOT create sin. Sin is the creature's problem.
You just about wrote a masters level thesis here full of philosophical gymnastics to force your preconceived ideas of Reformed theology onto God. Scripturally, it doesn't pan out.
I think the logic of your argument breaks down in your first paragraph.
For example:
Our sin didn't arise in a vacuum without some precursor, either within or without.
Whatever you mean by this, our sin was possible because God created us with the ability to choose to sin.
That's about all I'll say. To take your comment point by point would require a week.
God bless, my friend :)
You know, it's funny how things happen. I was responding to a question on another post and I was reminded of this article. I think it really gets at what everyone's been talking past each other about. It deals with the origin of sin/evil, whether God's sovereignty in ordaining sin makes Him the author of sin/evil, and why He would ordain that which He hates.
And I know this post is going to go off the front page soon, and so the comments will be closed, but I offer the above link to anyone still reading as a summary of this Calvinist's position of the origins of evil and sin.
Here's a quote from the article (from Jonathan Edwards) for anyone not wanting to read through the whole thing, even though you should.
It is a proper and excellent thing for infinite glory to shine forth; and for the same reason, it is proper that the shining forth of God's glory should be complete; that is, that all parts of his glory should shine forth, that every beauty should be proportionably effulgent, that the beholder may have a proper notion of God. It is not proper that one glory should be exceedingly manifested, and another not at all. . . .
Thus it is necessary, that God's awful majesty, his authority and dreadful greatness, justice, and holiness, should be manifested. But this could not be, unless sin and punishment had been decreed; so that the shining forth of God's glory would be very imperfect, both because these parts of divine glory would not shine forth as the others do, and also the glory of his goodness, love, and holiness would be faint without them; nay, they could scarcely shine forth at all.
If it were not right that God should decree and permit and punish sin, there could be no manifestation of God's holiness in hatred of sin, or in showing any preference, in his providence, of godliness before it. There would be no manifestation of God's grace or true goodness, if there was no sin to be pardoned, no misery to be saved from. How much happiness soever he bestowed, his goodness would not be so much prized and admired. . . .
So evil is necessary, in order to the highest happiness of the creature, and the completeness of that communication of God, for which he made the world; because the creature's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, and the sense of his love. And if the knowledge of him be imperfect, the happiness of the creature must be proportionably imperfect.
Mike,
These quotes by Edwards seem to suggest that the glory and goodness of God is dependent on sin and evil. Do you believe that? Is sin and evil a necessary pre-requisite for the good? How could God's perfectly good nature exist prior to sin then? This seems to raise more questions than it answers IMO.
God Bless,
Ben
Ben,
Edwards deals with your question directly in "The End for Which God Created the World." I highly recommend it to you if you haven't gone through it. And if you have, I'd point you back there to answer your question.
But I'll try to paraphrase the ideas from memory just not to be a jerk and say, "Go read this book." The book is about what excited God to create the world. The answer is, in most simple terms, for His ultimate glory. The creation of the world is the overflow of God's benevolence and goodness in a communication of Himself.
To answer your question more directly, before creation God's goodness and benevolence was perfectly in tact and infinite and not dependent on anything, even sin. Yet it wasn't consummated. It existed in attribute but not in expression. So that's the real answer to your question. God was totally good and perfect in attribute before creation. But that goodness was consummated in its communication in time.
God indeed was gracious, merciful, loving, as well as just, righteous, wrathful, and holy before the creation. But there'd be no way to know that God with those attributes without the expression of those attributes. And the expression of even, say, grace, for example, is impossible without people to be gracious to. And one cannot be gracious to people if they don't need grace. Again, read the book, but I believe the principle of Romans 11:32 shows up here: "For God has shut up all in disobedience so that He may show mercy to all." (I recognize the immediate context of that verse is about Israel and the Church, but I'm saying that I think the principle can be drawn out and applied to the general character and workings of God, similarly to how we icky Calvinists do the same with Romans 9.)
Now, the question will be raised, "So does that mean God needed to create to express Himself perfectly?" The answer is yes and no. If the question is, "Could creating be the only way of God manifesting His glory?" then the answer is yes. And that's not a problem, which I'll touch on a bit further down. But if the question is, "Is God's glory dependent on us?" The answer is no. Not at all. God created and communicated Himself out of the fullness of His goodness, benevolence, and glory, not out of any emptiness of need in Himself. "Surely, it is no argument of indigence in God, that He is inclined to communicate of His infinite fullness. It is no argument of the emptiness or deficiency of a fountain, that it is inclined to overflow" (Edwards).
So we wouldn't say God, even though creating for His own glory, properly needed anything outside Himself. But the fullness of goodness that existed in God excited Him to communicate all of that goodness, because the full communication of infinite, all-satisfying glory is the most loving and beneficent thing anyone could do. And love requires the communication of all of those glories: grace, mercy, love, but also wrath, justice, and holiness. Thus, God ordained that evil be "in order to the highest happiness of the creature, and the completeness of that communication of God, for which he made the world; because the creature's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, and the sense of his love. And if the knowledge of him be imperfect, the happiness of the creature must be proportionably imperfect."
Mike,
Just a few quick comments as I don't have much time.
First, you say that God created and communicated out of His benevolence, but that would only hold true for the elect since it can hardly be called benevolent that God created the reprobate just to communicate His wrath to them.
Second, you wrote:
And love requires the communication of all of those glories: grace, mercy, love, but also wrath, justice, and holiness.
Well, hasn't the Son always loved the Father and the Father always loved the Son? If love requires the communication of wrath, then how did the Trinity exist in perfect love prior to sin and evil? How can it be said that God "is love" if love is not inherent in His eternal nature or essence? And if it is inherent then it would seem, again, that wrath, and therefore sin and evil, must have eternally existed as well, else God could not be love nor communicate love in Tri-unity.
And again, such statements as these,
Thus, God ordained that evil be "in order to the highest happiness of the creature, and the completeness of that communication of God, for which he made the world; because the creature's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, and the sense of his love. And if the knowledge of him be imperfect, the happiness of the creature must be proportionably imperfect."
...can only apply to the elect, so why isn't God compelled to perfect the happiness of the reprobate as well?
And lastly, wasn't God's wrath poured out on Christ at the cross? Wouldn't God's wrath on sin be fully demonstrated at the cross without the need to irrevocably reprobate certain individuals from all eternity?
So I still see more questions than answers and I also think such notions threaten God's aseity, but I don't have the time to get into that right now.
God Bless,
Ben
Mike,
Just stumbled onto this article that I think refutes Piper and Edwards and makes many of the same points I was trying to make.
DIVINE ASEITY, DIVINE FREEDOM:
A CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM FOR EDWARDSIAN-CALVINISM
God Bless,
Ben
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